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THE EPA AT 40: AN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
RICHARD N. L. ANDREWS* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Environmental Protection Agency is in many respects a 
unique agency in the overall structure of United States governance.1 
Created in 1970 by presidential initiative rather than congressional 
legislation, it was given a sweeping new series of statutory mandates 
and powers that both nationalized the core functions of pollution and 
toxic chemicals control, and defined them overwhelmingly as 
regulatory functions—augmented in some cases by federal 
subsidies—rather than broader and more integrated management 
responsibilities. Paradoxically, it was given these mandates in 
response to massive bipartisan popular demand for federal leadership 
in solving the pollution problem at a time when the public was 
otherwise increasingly skeptical of and even hostile to the federal 
government. Liberals were opposed to the government’s Vietnam 
War policies; conservatives resisted the government’s civil rights 
policies; and the growing environmental movement itself questioned 
the government’s policies of multipurpose dam-building and stream 
channelization, clear-cutting of the national forests, promotion and 
subsidization of nuclear power, and more generally promoting the use 
of the natural environment primarily for industrial resource 
extraction and economic development. 
In the academic literature of the 1960s and early 1970s, political 
scientists were writing scathingly about the capture of agencies by the 
businesses they were supposed to be regulating, and about the control 
of policymaking by “iron triangles” of favored interests, congressional 
subcommittees beholden to them, and the agencies they oversaw. 
Economists were becoming increasingly vocal against these traits in 
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economic regulatory agencies responsible for regulating the airline, 
trucking and railroad, and telecommunications industries. In short, 
the Progressive ideal that had justified the discretionary powers of the 
federal agencies for two-thirds of a century since Theodore 
Roosevelt—the ideal of good government through scientific 
management by politically neutral, technocratic administrators—was 
becoming increasingly discredited from the left as well as the right.2 
Yet in the midst of all these criticisms of government, both 
academic and popular, a conservative Republican president, Richard 
Nixon, created the Environmental Protection Agency. And in the 
Congress, solidly bipartisan majorities vested this new agency with 
sweeping new powers to regulate pollution and toxic chemicals, to 
impose federal mandates on state and local governments both to 
implement and comply with these regulations, and to subsidize both 
state regulatory agencies and local wastewater treatment facilities on 
an unprecedented scale. 
By the end of its first decade, EPA had begun to achieve 
significant results in reducing pollution from the sources it was 
empowered to regulate, although the limitations and costs of those 
successes were also becoming evident. A more serious problem was 
developing, however: a fracturing of the bipartisan support that EPA 
had initially enjoyed. While environmental protection remained a 
widely supported and largely nonpartisan value for the general public, 
among elected politicians and interest groups it became a surrogate 
for an increasingly ideological and partisan conflict over the role of 
government regulation in achieving it. This reframing of the issue 
pitted liberal Democrats, and a dwindling minority of moderate 
Republicans, against an increasingly vocal anti-government core of 
the Republican Party which was augmented on individual issues by 
Democrats from districts whose businesses were burdened by 
environmental regulations. 
As a result, the EPA has become confined to incomplete and 
variable implementation of a set of laws and policies that, with few 
exceptions, were put in place more than thirty years ago. It has been 
chronically underfunded and subjected to increasing burdens of 
proof, oversight, and litigation; and with changes in presidential 
administrations, its priorities have repeatedly been subjected to 
radical swings and even attempts at fundamental reversal. None of its 
basic statutes have been repealed—few have even been significantly 
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modified—and the general public still supports environmental 
protection broadly, if only shallowly. But even policy reforms that 
would arguably benefit both the economy and the environment have 
been held hostage to the increasingly bitter partisan and ideological 
gridlock of Congressional and presidential politics. 
This history need not be destiny. Environmental protection is too 
important—to the economy, to the American people, and to the 
continued sustainability of modern civilization—to be consigned to 
the status of a political football of partisan and ideological politics. 
Serious environmental hazards remain unsolved: global warming 
most obviously, but also air and water pollution, groundwater and 
marine contamination, and new health hazards such as nanoparticles, 
among others. Environmental protection often has characteristics that 
require government intervention—most obviously market failures 
such as externalities and open-access resources (“tragedies of the 
commons”)—but it is not inherently anti-business. From a firm’s 
perspective, not only is pollution a waste of materials and energy that 
have been bought and paid for, but it also creates liability risks and 
other harmful social costs. From a broader economic perspective, it 
also creates jobs in firms that impose less social costs in the forms of 
damage to health and environmental assets. 
Environmental protection is not necessarily best accomplished, 
however, solely by the regulatory tools that were most attractive in 
the 1970s. Both the economy and the environment could be better 
served by policy innovations that would promote more integrated 
solutions, more self-enforcing incentives, and more rigorous, yet more 
stable, environmental performance expectations. The challenge for 
Americans on all points of the political spectrum who aspire to 
maintain a livable environment, as well as a healthy and innovative 
economy, is to move EPA from its partially successful but 
problematic history over the past forty years to a renewed vision of 
the environment we want to live in and pass on, and to a more 
effective and integrated suite of policy tools and priorities for 
achieving that vision. 
This article provides an historical perspective on the origins of 
EPA, its mission and structure, its history to date, and the challenges 
it faces as a result both of the strengths and limitations of its powers 
and of the changing political context in which it must function. The 
article then suggests some of the ways in which environmental 
protection could be pursued differently and perhaps more effectively 
than under mere continuation of EPA’s traditional regulatory 
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authorities, and it documents the challenges of path dependence and 
political gridlock that would have to be overcome to achieve a more 
effective framework for U.S. environmental protection policy. 
II. ORIGINS 
The EPA was created in the context of an extraordinary outburst 
of mass public pressure for federal action to address the widespread 
pollution problems that had resulted from the vast post-war growth in 
industrial production and mass consumption. Environmental 
protection had historically been left almost entirely to state and local 
jurisdictions—a president as recent as Dwight Eisenhower had 
described air and water pollution as “uniquely local” problems3—and 
while a few states such as California had taken aggressive actions to 
address some pollution problems, most had not. Those few that 
sought to do so were limited by a lack of powers to address interstate 
sources and by the risk of losing businesses and jobs to more lenient 
states. 
With the advent of television and the rise of a relatively affluent 
mass middle class, the American public in the 1960s witnessed a series 
of environmental crises: extreme smog disasters in Los Angeles and 
elsewhere, radioactive fallout in milk, the indiscriminate use of 
pesticides, the Santa Barbara oil spill, Ohio’s Cuyahoga River 
catching fire, Lake Erie being declared “dead” due to oxygen 
depletion, the environmental risks of the proposed Trans-Alaska 
Pipeline System, and others. By 1970, a common concern had begun 
to develop that environmental pollution was out of control. This 
concern culminated in April 1970 with the first Earth Day 
celebration, the largest nationwide public demonstrations that had 
occurred since the victory celebrations at the end of World War II.4 
President Richard Nixon had no previous record of public 
concern for the environment except a single radio address during his 
1968 campaign, but he recognized both the risk posed and the 
opportunity presented by the mass public demand for federal action 
on the issue. Senator Edmund Muskie, a Democrat from Maine and 
the author of most of the federal environmental legislation in the 
1960s and of the Clean Air Act amendments then under 
consideration, was widely recognized as a likely presidential 
 
 3.  JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, POLITICS AND POLICY: THE EISENHOWER, KENNEDY, AND 
JOHNSON YEARS 323 (1968). 
 4.  ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 201–26. 
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candidate in 1972. At the same time, mass public demand for federal 
action on the environment offered a welcome opportunity for 
presidential leadership on a consensus issue: diverting the national 
agenda from the divisiveness of the Vietnam War and civil rights 
issues that were otherwise dominant. 
It is fair to say that President Nixon saw a mob coming, jumped 
in front of it and called it a parade. On New Year’s Day 1970 he 
signed the National Environmental Policy Act (no relation to EPA, 
but a visionary statement of federal policy commitment to 
environmental protection) on national television, declaring the 1970s 
to be the “decade of the environment” in which “it was either now or 
never” to clean up pollution and environmental damage.5 In late 
January, he addressed environmental issues forcefully in his State of 
the Union address.6 Subsequently, in February, he delivered a special 
environmental speech to Congress, enunciating a specific 37-point 
program for environmental cleanup.7 In April, the first Earth Day 
celebration took place.8 In July, Nixon issued a Presidential 
Reorganization Plan creating the Environmental Protection Agency, 
to take effect that December.9 And in December, Congress passed 
and Nixon signed the landmark Clean Air Act of 1970,10 the first of a 
series of major new environmental statutes establishing primary 
federal regulatory authority for control of pollution and toxic 
chemicals. 
III. STRUCTURE 
The EPA was actually Nixon’s second choice for an 
environmental agency. The initial proposal recommended by his 
Council on Executive Reorganization, chaired by Roy Ash, was for a 
unified Department of the Environment, pulling together all the 
major agencies that had environmental responsibilities, including 
 
 5.  Frank Gannon, RN in ‘70—Launching the Decade of the Environment (Jan. 1, 2010), 
http://thenewnixon.org/2010/01/01/rn-in-70-the-decade-of-the-environment/. 
 6.  Richard M. Nixon, President, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the 
Union (Jan. 22, 1970), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ 
index.php?pid=2921#ixzz1ZpHKDU5P. 
 7.  Richard M. Nixon, President, Special Message to the Congress on Environmental 
Quality (Feb. 10, 1970), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ 
index.php?pid=2757#axzz1ZpHtZNrz. 
 8.  Jack Manning, Mood Is Joyful as City Gives Its Support; Millions Join Earth Day 
Observances Across the Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1970, at 1. 
 9.  Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623, 84 Stat. 2086. 
 10.  Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676. 
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environmental management agencies such as the Forest Service, 
Interior Department, and the civilian water management programs of 
the Army Corps of Engineers.11 Such an agency could perhaps have 
used a far broader range of integrated management and regulatory 
policies to manage and protect the environment. Like Franklin 
Roosevelt’s proposal for a Department of Conservation in the 1940s, 
however, this proposal would have required congressional approval 
and faced strong opposition from the traditional constituencies of the 
Forest Service and the Corps of Engineers. The proposal for a unified 
Department of the Environment was dropped in favor of a mere 
reorganization of administrative units already present in the executive 
branch, which could be accomplished by presidential fiat: a 
presidential reorganization plan did not require congressional 
approval, but only that both houses of Congress not act to disapprove 
it within sixty days.12 
The EPA was thus created simply by pulling into one new agency 
an array of environmental health regulatory and technical assistance 
functions, and their associated statutory authorities, that were 
previously spread across multiple existing agencies.13 Air pollution 
control was transferred from the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare, as were environmental health services including solid 
waste management, water hygiene, and some radiological health and 
environmental control programs; water quality administration was 
transferred from the Interior Department, to which it had been 
moved from the Public Health Service in the 1960s; pesticide 
regulation programs were transferred from the Agriculture, Interior, 
and Health, Education, and Welfare departments; radiation 
protection standard-setting was transferred from the Atomic Energy 
Commission; and ecological systems functions were transferred from 
the Council on Environmental Quality.14 
Because EPA was merely the result of a presidential 
reorganization plan and not created by legislation, no new powers or 
resources were provided. It had no overall “organic act” that would 
 
 11.  Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal 
Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 315 (1991). 
 12.  RONALD C. MOE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30876, THE PRESIDENT’S 
REORGANIZATION AUTHORITY: REVIEW AND ANALYSIS, at CRS-4 (2001), available at 
http://www.oswego.edu/~ruddy/Educational%20Policy/CRS%20Reports/President’s%20Reorg
anization%20Authority.pdf. 
 13.  Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623, 84 Stat. 2086. 
 14.  ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 229. 
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authorize its administrator to integrate or set priorities among its 
various programs. It was merely a holding company for separate 
programs, each continuing to operate under its own separate 
statutory authority and budget, and each with its associated 
subculture. EPA’s regulatory authority in turn was created or vastly 
expanded piecemeal, mainly during the 1970s, a decade that saw the 
passage of nearly a dozen major new statutes regulating air pollution, 
water pollution, solid and hazardous wastes, drinking water, 
pesticides, and toxic substances.15 Although these new statutes added 
to the agency’s powers and responsibilities, none of them authorized 
EPA to provide overall management of water, air, or land resources, 
or even integrated management of pollutant discharges to these 
several environmental media. The statutes were even authored and 
overseen by several different congressional subcommittees. EPA’s 
only formal basis for setting overall priorities was the administrator’s 
negotiations with the president and Congress for its annual budget 
and appropriations legislation. 
In short, EPA was created primarily as a regulatory agency for 
specific types of pollutants and environmental contaminants, and 
secondarily as a source of federal subsidies for wastewater treatment, 
state environmental staffing, and some other purposes. Due to this 
emphasis on an adversarial regulatory mission and lack of full 
departmental status, it is virtually unique among the environmental 
ministries of the other industrial democracies.16 Despite its name, 
EPA has never been given broad statutory authority to protect or 
manage the environment, to lead U.S. efforts to create an 
environmentally sustainable economy, or even to integrate 
management of the pollutants it regulates. 
Even as a regulatory agency, EPA is something of a hybrid. 
Unlike several of the economic regulatory agencies, which are 
established as independent commissions and thus designed to 
function with primary duty to their statutes and not to White House 
 
 15.  See Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676; Resource 
Recovery Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-512, 84 Stat. 1227; Water Quality Improvement Act of 
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91; Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816; Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, 
Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973; Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 
(1974); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976); 
Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003; Clean Water Act of 
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566; Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980). 
 16.  ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 231. 
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politics, EPA’s administrator and other senior staff are appointed 
by—and change with—each president.17 There have been repeated 
legislative proposals since 1988 to elevate EPA to a Cabinet-level 
Department of Environmental Protection, but each attempt has failed 
in at least one house of the Congress due to unacceptable additions, 
such as an amendment mandating risk–cost–benefit analysis of all 
regulations or an amendment creating an Office of Environmental 
Statistics that would be independent of presidential oversight, among 
others.18 
Internally, EPA at its creation had to assimilate a wide range of 
disparate subcultures. Air quality and solid waste management, for 
instance, had historically been technical assistance programs within 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare rather than 
regulatory programs. Water quality was still evolving from a drinking-
water focus in the Public Health Service to greater emphasis on 
ambient water quality improvement in Interior. Pesticide regulation 
in USDA had been more focused on effectiveness and farmer-
friendly technical assistance than on health and environmental 
protection. To respond to public demands for more vigorous 
environmental protection, and to faithfully carry out EPA’s new 
regulatory mandates as they were enacted, its administrators had to 
create out of these cultures a more adversarial overall culture of 
regulatory standard-setting and enforcement. 19 
EPA’s first administrator, William Ruckelshaus, was an 
aggressive Republican prosecutor determined to establish EPA’s 
credibility and political independence as a regulatory agency that 
would be faithful to its statutory mandates and to public expectations 
for standard-setting and enforcement, and not subservient to White 
House and business politics. In several key cases, he successfully 
stood up to White House pressures in enforcing against business 
supporters of the president.20 He also created several cross-cutting 
 
 17.  Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623, 84 Stat. 2086. 
 18.  Philip Shabecoff, House Votes Bill to Elevate E.P.A. to Cabinet Level, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 29, 1990, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/03/29/us/house-votes-bill-to-elevate-epa-to-cabinet-
level.html. 
 19.  ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 229–32. 
 20.  See J. Patrick Dobel, Managerial Leadership in Divided Times: William Ruckelshaus 
and the Paradoxes of Independence, 26 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 488 (1995). As a condition of his 
reappointment at the start of Nixon’s second term, Ruckelshaus also demanded and received 
control over regulatory initiatives opposed by Nixon’s Office of Management and Budget. Id.; 
JOHN QUARLES, CLEANING UP AMERICA: AN INSIDER’S VIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY 117–18, 125–61 (1976). 
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functional units within the agency—enforcement, and research and 
development, for instance—separate from the air, water, and 
pesticides units that the agency had inherited.21 He also created ten 
regional offices—often overlooked by the national media, but the 
locus of a large fraction of EPA’s staff—where much of EPA’s day-
to-day work is done in cooperation with state agencies.22 
IV. STATUTORY POWERS AND MANDATES 
During the 1970s, bipartisan congressional majorities enacted a 
sweeping range of new national environmental regulatory statutes, 
most of them signed by Republican presidents. These statutes at face 
value gave the EPA an unprecedented range of new powers and 
mandates to reduce pollution discharges to air, water, and land, and 
to protect the public from the health risks of pesticides and other 
toxic chemicals. Taken together, they created a far-reaching new role 
for the federal government, establishing a set of national regulatory 
frameworks—including direct federal regulation of products sold in 
interstate commerce, such as pesticides and motor vehicles, and 
others delegated as mandates to be carried out by the states within 
frameworks and standards established by EPA—to protect the 
environment and public health against the hazards caused by human 
wastes and other contaminants. 
These statutory powers were of several types. For air quality, 
EPA was to set national ambient air quality standards based solely on 
health science with an adequate margin of safety, without respect to 
the costs of achieving them; the public should be free to travel 
throughout the country without risk to their health from polluted 
air.23 For new stationary sources of air pollutant emissions and all 
point sources of wastewater discharges—generally, industries and 
municipal wastewater treatment plants—EPA was to set permit 
standards based on the “best available technology,” essentially, the 
most effective technologies already in use by the best firms in each 
industry.24 For motor vehicles, Congress set technology-forcing 
 
 21.  ROBERT MCMAHON, The Institutional Structure of the EPA, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY: STRUCTURING MOTIVATION IN A GREEN BUREAUCRACY 33, 33–52 
(2006). 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2006). 
 24.  Id § 7479(3) (defining “best available control technology”); 33 U.S.C. §§ 
1314(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B) (2006) (wastewater); Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) 
Basic Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/NSR/psd.html (last 
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requirements by statute, requiring 90% reduction of tailpipe 
emissions by 1975.25 And for drinking water contaminants, hazardous 
air pollutants, toxic water pollutants, pesticides, and other toxic 
chemicals—potentially thousands of specific substances—EPA was to 
set restrictions that balanced the risk of human exposure against the 
costs and benefits of the proposed restrictions on each substance.26 
Implementing these statutes represented a Herculean task: 
Ruckelshaus once famously compared EPA’s responsibility to 
“perform[ing] an appendectomy on yourself while running a hundred-
yard dash.”27 These statutes were the only tools, however, that 
Congress had authorized and directed EPA to use. Congress had 
deliberately mandated that EPA set technology-based standards 
(“command and control”) because they were easily enforceable—an 
inspector had only to determine whether or not the approved 
technology was present and functioning properly—and easily 
defensible: since the standards were based on technologies already 
used by the best firms in each industry, they could not easily be 
challenged in court as “impractical.” They also could be implemented 
far more quickly than the risk-based statutes, which in contrast placed 
a far heavier burden of proof on EPA to prove that a proposed 
regulation was both justified and practical, thereby inviting endless 
litigation of the science and leading to relatively few substances ever 
being fully investigated and regulated. EPA’s risk analyses were often 
based on limited scientific knowledge, but under U.S. legal principles 
the Agency bore the primary burden of proof to justify regulation, 
rather than the manufacturer or the supplier to prove their safety.28 
Within a decade of its creation, EPA thus became arguably the 
largest and most powerful environmental agency in the world. In its 
early years it banned domestic use of DDT,29 began phasing out lead 
 
updated July 22, 2011); Water: Industry Effluent Guidelines: Frequent Questions, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/scitech/wastetech/guide/questions_index.cfm (last updated 
Sept. 29, 2011). 
 25.  Mobile Source Emission—Past, Present, and Future: Milestones, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/oms/invntory/overview/solutions/milestones.htm (last updated 
July 9, 2007). 
 26.  See supra note 15. 
 27.  As EPA Turns 40, IU Professor Recalls Its Creation, IND. UNIV., http://newsinfo.iu.edu/ 
news/page/normal/16660.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2011). 
 28.  ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 232–37, 242–49. 
 29.  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DDT: A REVIEW OF SCIENTIFIC AND ECONOMIC 
ASPECTS OF THE DECISION TO BAN ITS USE AS A PESTICIDE 1 (1975), available at http:// 
www.nal.usda.gov/speccoll/findaids/agentorange/text/01183.pdf. 
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from gasoline,30 and began promulgating the wide range of emissions 
and contaminant standards mandated by the Clean Air, Clean Water, 
and Safe Drinking Water Acts, as well as persuading Congress to pass 
major amendments to the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts in 1977.31 
By the late 1970s, EPA had substantially reduced pollutant emissions 
from electric utilities and industrial smokestacks, industrial and 
municipal wastewater discharges, and automobiles.32 It also had ended 
open burning of wastes and closed down some 5,000 open dumps, 
forcing professionalization of solid waste management and separate 
tracking and safe disposal of hazardous industrial wastes.33 In 1978, it 
banned nonessential uses of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) due to their 
damaging effects on stratospheric ozone.34 Beginning in 1978, EPA 
had to tackle cleanup of the disastrous contamination of the Love 
Canal site in upstate New York, and in 1980, it began implementing a 
massive nationwide cleanup program for “Superfund” sites 
contaminated by past dumping of toxic chemicals.35 
For businesses subject to EPA’s regulations, however, a 
problematic consequence of this history was that while the air, water, 
and solid and hazardous waste statutes were enacted piecemeal over 
much of a decade, each statute affected many of the same industrial 
processes. The lack of a unified statutory framework, or even a 
coherent vision for overall pollution prevention and reduction, meant 
that each statute therefore triggered new costs and recalculations of 
optimal pollution control strategies. Reducing air pollution at the 
smokestack, required in 1970, produced more materials to be 
disposed in liquid slurries or landfills. Reducing water pollution, 
required in 1972, shifted an even greater burden to landfills. Finally, 
the solid and hazardous waste legislation, passed in 1976, dramatically 
raised the standards, and thus the costs, for landfill disposal as well. 
Moreover, if the statutes were implemented literally and rigorously, 
 
 30.  Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Requires Phase-Out of Lead in All 
Grades of Gasoline (Nov. 28, 1973), available at http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/lead/03.html. 
 31.  Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685; Clean Water Act 
of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566. 
 32.  J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE UNITED 
STATES: EVALUATING THE SYSTEM 56, 69 (1998). 
 33.  ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 245–49. 
 34.  Certain Fluorocarbons (Chlorofluorocarbons) in Food, Food Additive, Drug, Animal 
Food, Animal Drug, Cosmetic, and Medical Device Products as Propellants in Self-Pressurized 
Containers: Prohibition on Use, 43 Fed. Reg. 11,301 (Mar. 17, 1978). 
 35.  See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767. 
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achieving ambient air quality standards in areas not already in 
compliance with them could in theory require stopping any new 
economic growth that would increase pollution—an unachievable 
outcome in an area such as southern California, for instance. 
V. INNOVATIONS FROM WITHIN 
To the agency’s credit, leading administrators within EPA 
recognized these problems and proposed innovative solutions to 
them.36 Faced with the conundrum of achieving air quality 
improvement without closing down regional economies, EPA 
Assistant Administrator William Drayton, initially with no clear 
statutory authority, proposed a series of more flexible market-
oriented policy instruments—emissions offsets and offsets “banking,” 
tradable permits, netting and “bubbling” of emissions (treating each 
source facility as if under a single “bubble,” rather than requiring best 
technology on each stack and vent)—which EPA then persuaded 
Congress to approve in its 1977 amendments.37 These were the first of 
a far broader range of “market-oriented instruments” which Congress 
subsequently approved for EPA use, including tradable production 
phasedown quotas for leaded gasoline and chlorofluorocarbons and 
ultimately the widely hailed “cap and trade” program under the 1990 
Clean Air Act amendments for reducing sulfur and nitrogen 
emissions from power plants.38 
By the late 1970s, however, businesses subject to repeated 
piecemeal regulation regrouped under an alternative new framing of 
the issues: a campaign against overregulation, big government, and 
bureaucratic zealotry,39 accompanied by pejorative attacks on 
 
 36.  ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 251. 
 37.  Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685; DAVID 
BORNSTEIN, HOW TO CHANGE THE WORLD: SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS AND THE POWER OF 
NEW IDEAS 53–56 (2004) (discussing Drayton and his “bubble” concept); OFFICE OF POLICY, 
ECON., & INNOVATION [OPEI], U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-240-R-01-001, THE UNITED 
STATES EXPERIENCE WITH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 67, 
72–75 (2001), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwAN/EE-0216B-
13.pdf/$file/EE-0216B-13.pdf; Laurens H. Rhinelander, The Bubble Concept: A Pragmatic 
Approach to Regulation Under the Clean Air Act, 1 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 177, 191 (1981). 
 38.  See OPEI, supra note 37. 
 39.  Id. at 255–56. See also MURRAY WEIDENBAUM, THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS 
REGULATION (1980). These attacks used longstanding criticisms by economists of the older 
economic regulatory programs (airlines, trucking and railroads, telecommunications, electric 
generation), several of which were in the process of deregulation at the time, to disparage 
environmental, health, and safety regulations as well, despite the significant differences between 
economic regulation—which had in practice protected favored businesses from competition—
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environmental regulations as “command and control” and “one size 
fits all.”40 In fairness to EPA, these were the statutory tools and 
mandates EPA had been given by Congress. Some economists had 
proposed more market-oriented environmental policy strategies as 
early as the late 1960s, such as Pigovian taxes or even marketable 
permits,41 but no strong stakeholder groups advocated for them at the 
time. Environmental advocacy groups saw no guaranteed 
environmental benefits of taxes and opposed giving the industries a 
legal “right to pollute,” while businesses themselves, if they had to be 
regulated, preferred certainty and simplicity of clear requirements 
binding on all competitors to a tax or marketable permit system that 
might cost them more and increase their economic uncertainty. 
Ironically, it was during the same period of the late 1970s, as 
businesses began to lobby more intensively against environmental 
regulation, that leading businesses and business consultants first 
began to champion the proposal that “pollution prevention pays.” 
Pollution not only causes social costs, but also represents inefficiency 
in the businesses themselves: a waste of materials and energy that had 
been bought and paid for, and a potential source of increased 
financial liability, which could often be corrected to the benefit of the 
business rather than merely as deadweight costs. 42 
VI. DEREGULATION AND ITS DAMAGE: THE LOST OPPORTUNITY 
FOR POLICY REFORM AND INNOVATION 
When Ronald Reagan was elected president in 1980, one of his 
transition teams made a series of recommendations to him to adopt 
and build upon the emerging proposals for market-oriented 
instruments to reform environmental policy and promote pollution 
prevention.43 These ideas were already beginning to gain traction 
 
and health, safety, and environmental regulation, which protected the public from market 
failures such as environmental externalities and tragedies of the commons. 
 40.  Cf. Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When Is Command-and-Control Efficient? 
Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for 
Environmental Protection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 887. Perhaps ironically, “one size fits all” was once 
a positive marketing slogan for socks, not a derogatory label for uniform national standards. 
 41.  See, e.g., J. H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY, AND PRICES (1968); Larry Ruff, The 
Economic Common Sense of Pollution, 19 PUB. INT. 69, 78–82 (1970). 
 42.  ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 262–66; Michael Royston, Making Pollution Prevention 
Pay, HARV. L. REV. 6, 6–27 (1980). See also generally MICHAEL ROYSTON, POLLUTION 
PREVENTION PAYS (1979). 
 43.  Richard N.L. Andrews, Deregulation: The Failure at EPA, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY IN THE 1980S: REAGAN’S NEW AGENDA 161 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 
1984). 
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among many opinion leaders. Given Reagan’s personal popularity 
and political momentum at the time, combined with the country’s 
economic concerns, he could perhaps have achieved significant 
reform of EPA’s regulatory mandates toward more moderate, 
market-oriented Republican principles. 
Instead, however, Reagan adopted the recommendations of a 
different transition team which focused on deregulation and proposed 
a far more radical agenda: to reverse and roll back the environmental 
policies of the previous decade. This team aimed to do so not by 
working with Congress to reform or repeal the statutes, but by 
administrative fiat. David Stockman, Reagan’s budget director, 
warned of a “Republican economic Dunkirk” due to a “ticking 
regulatory time bomb” as a torrent of new regulations under 
development strangled the economy, and Stockman therefore 
proposed cuts of more than 11% in EPA’s budget.44 Reagan himself 
announced his intention to “deregulate, defund, and devolve” 
environmental policymaking to the states.45 He issued an Executive 
Order mandating that the Office of Management and Budget review 
all proposed regulations, and directing that no new regulations be 
issued unless their economic benefits were shown to exceed their 
costs.46 His appointees to head EPA—including Anne Gorsuch (later 
Burford) as administrator—were chosen solely for loyalty to this 
agenda rather than for any expertise or experience in environmental 
protection, and were both isolated from and openly hostile to the 
Agency’s staff and mission.47 
The results were disastrous, not only for EPA and its 
environmental protection mission, but also for Reagan’s own agenda. 
He did succeed in converting the expensive wastewater treatment 
grants program to a low-interest loan program, and his budget cuts 
severely reduced EPA rulemaking and enforcement, but his attempts 
to roll back federal environmental protection regulation—especially 
by administrative fiat through hostile and incompetent 
 
 44.  Dave Stockman, The Stockman Manifesto: The New Budget Director’s Sweeping 
Blueprint for President Reagan’s First 100 Days, WASH. POST., Dec. 14, 1980, at C1 (excerpting a 
report Stockman wrote for then-President-elect Reagan entitled Avoiding a GOP Economic 
Dunkirk). 
 45.  Richard N.L. Andrews, Reform or Reaction?, in ANDREWS, supra note 1, 255, 257; 
Robert F. Durant, Hazardous Waste, Regulatory Reform, and the Reagan Revolution: The 
Ironies of an Activist Approach to Deactivating Bureaucracy, 53 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 550, 550 
(1993). 
 46.  Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981). 
 47.  Andrews, supra note 43, at 166. 
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administrators—ignited a firestorm of public and political backlash as 
well as reversals by the courts.48 Within three years Reagan found it 
necessary to fire sixteen of the top twenty presidential appointees at 
EPA, including both the administrator and the deputy administrator, 
perhaps the most sweeping mid-course replacement of senior agency 
staff in U.S. history.49 At least one appointee, a former industry 
lobbyist, went to jail for corruption, while the administrator was cited 
for contempt of Congress.50 Reagan found it necessary to persuade 
William Ruckelshaus, EPA’s first administrator, to return to EPA as 
administrator to restore its morale and public credibility.51 
Reagan himself was reelected in 1984, but the Democrats 
regained control of the Congress and passed several tough new 
environmental statutes containing “deadline and hammer” clauses: 
provisions designed to prevent further administrative undermining of 
regulatory statutes by automatically imposing draconian 
consequences if EPA did not issue mandated regulations within 
specified time periods.52 Ironically, however, these new mandates also 
fell most heavily on small businesses and local governments rather 
than large corporations, and thus increased friction between EPA and 
some key constituencies.53 
With a longer historical perspective, one can look back at 
Reagan’s first administration as a tragically missed opportunity and a 
fateful turning point in the development of U.S. environmental 
protection policy. Rather than championing more market-oriented 
reforms and innovations in EPA’s statutes and environmental policy 
tools at a moment when opinion leaders were growing receptive to 
them and a Republican-led version of them might have been 
promoted, Reagan sought to dismantle them, to undermine the 
agency itself, and to fundamentally repudiate the federal commitment 
to environmental protection by administrative fiat. In doing so, he 
severely overreached, shattering the bipartisanship that had largely 
characterized environmental policymaking throughout the 1970s. Just 
 
 48.  Id. at 173–177; Andrews, supra note 45, at 261. 
 49.  Andrews, supra note 43, at 174. 
 50.  Andrews, supra note 45, at 260; Costly Lies: Rita Lavelle is Convicted of Perjury, TIME, 
Dec. 12, 1983, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,921404,00.html; Obituary, 
Anne Burford, 62; Embattled EPA Chief for President Reagan, L.A. TIMES, July 22, 2004, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jul/22/local/me-burford22. 
 51.  Andrews, supra note 45, at 261. 
 52.  Id. at 261. 
 53.  ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 261–62. 
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at the moment when Michael Royston and some leading businesses 
were pioneering a new vision that pollution prevention could be 
profitable, Reagan’s overreach prompted congressional Democrats to 
dig in to protect existing statutes against any change. It also pushed 
the environmental advocacy organizations to distrust Republican calls 
for reform and instead to ally themselves more firmly with 
Democratic defenders of the existing statutes and regulatory 
programs. 
Reagan, in his second term, went on to sign several new 
environmental statutes and treaties, such as amendments to the Safe 
Drinking Water Act and Clean Water Act, a toxics “right-to-know” 
law (the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act), 
and the Montreal Protocol phasing out production of stratospheric 
ozone-depleting chemicals (chlorofluorocarbons).54 He appointed Lee 
Thomas, a low-profile career EPA official, as EPA administrator 
after Ruckelshaus.55 Thomas’s main contributions included banning 
further uses of asbestos, implementing amendments to the Safe 
Drinking Water Act and the Superfund program, and sponsoring an 
agency-wide, risk-based review of EPA’s programs and priorities, 
seeking to make the case for clearer prioritization of environmental 
hazards.56 Critics, however, also attacked EPA during this period for 
failing to more aggressively regulate risks which were already within 
its jurisdiction, such as pesticide and lead exposure and contaminants 
in drinking water.57 
Reagan’s initial radicalism, however, had opened and 
exacerbated a deep ideological fault line between support for 
environmental protection and hostility to the federal government, a 
division which would increasingly be exploited for partisan advantage 
by Newt Gingrich in 1994, by George W. Bush during his presidency, 
and by others. In principle, there is every reason to believe that a 
 
 54.  Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986, Pub L. No. 99-359, 100 Stat. 642; 
Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 100 Stat. 7; Emergency Planning and Community 
Right-to-Know Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1733; Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987). 
 55.  Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Lee M. Thomas Biography (Nov. 29, 1984), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/history/admin/agency/thomas.html. 
 56.  ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 268–70; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-230-2-87-025a, 
UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS 
(1987). 
 57.  See, e.g., Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 U.S. 1361 (1993); 
Am. Water Works Ass’n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 40 F.3d 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (decided on 
petitioners’ challenges to EPA regulations initially proposed in 1988 on lead in drinking water). 
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healthy environment is compatible with and even necessary to a 
healthy economy, and that while this requires some clear roles for 
government, more market-oriented policy innovations could achieve 
both environmental and economic benefits more effectively than the 
mere continuation of the regulatory statutes of the 1970s. By 
attempting to dismantle those statutes rather than reform them, 
however, and by re-framing the issue as government over-regulation 
rather than environmental protection, Reagan and his successors held 
EPA and its environmental policy mandates hostage to a broader 
ideological battle between the most entrenched interests in both the 
business and environmental advocacy communities, and between 
Republican and Democratic strategists seeking partisan advantage. 
This false dichotomy continues to stalemate environmental policy 
reform and innovation more than a quarter century later. 
The more aggressive anti-regulatory organizations, meanwhile, 
refocused their attention on attacking the scientific justifications for 
EPA’s risk-based regulations. Throughout the late 1980s and early 
1990s, EPA’s regulatory proposals were constantly attacked in the 
news media, the courts, and quasi-academic books as being based on 
“junk science.”58 
In response to this increased politicization of EPA’s scientific 
and rulemaking processes, both EPA and environmental advocacy 
groups began seeking more self-enforcing incentives that could 
promote environmental protection without the staff-intensive and 
time-consuming burdens of EPA’s regulatory process. An early 
precursor was the strict joint and several liability provision in the 
Superfund Act of 1980, which created the threat of severe economic 
consequences for any business that had dumped hazardous waste into 
contaminated sites.59 In 1986, after the Bhopal industrial disaster—in 
which large numbers of people were killed or sickened by toxic 
chemicals leaking from an American-operated pesticide factory in 
India—Congress passed the Emergency Planning and Community 
Right to Know Act, which required businesses to disclose and EPA to 
publicly list the annual quantities of toxic chemicals they used and 
any leaks or releases of them into the environment.60 Direct public 
pressure would thus become a complement or alternative to EPA 
regulation. Similarly, as naturally occurring radon became recognized 
 
 58.  ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 277–80 and accompanying notes and references. 
 59.  42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2006). 
 60.  Id. §§ 11002–03. 
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as a hazard in some homes and public buildings, rather than regulate 
it directly EPA was authorized in 1988 to set scientifically-based 
radon action levels and provide technical assistance for state radon 
inspection programs, thus letting property sale negotiations serve as 
an alternative to regulation.61 
VII.  RECLAIMING THE ISSUE: GEORGE H.W. BUSH AND EPA 
ADMINISTRATOR BILL REILLY 
In 1988, George H.W. Bush was elected president. His campaign 
capitalized on his position as Reagan’s vice president, but also 
differentiated him as a pro-environment candidate. Bush was by then 
a Texan, but from a moderate and patrician New England Republican 
background, and one suspects that he sought for both personal and 
political reasons to try to reaffirm and reclaim a Republican version 
of the environmental policy agenda from the partisan polarization to 
which it had become hostage. Described by one source as 
“conservative on the size of government but progressive and in favor 
of more action on environmental protection,”62 he ran on promises to 
strengthen the Clean Air Act and to achieve “no net loss” of 
wetlands, and in public speeches he emphasized the increasingly 
global nature of environmental hazards.63 He appointed William 
Reilly as his EPA administrator, a Republican moderate who was 
deeply knowledgeable about environmental science and policy, and 
widely respected by both Republicans and Democrats, as well as by 
businesses and environmental advocacy groups. Reilly also enjoyed 
with Bush the closest personal relationship that any EPA 
administrator has had with their president. 
Under Reilly’s leadership, EPA’s senior managers and Science 
Advisory Board followed through on Lee Thomas’s Unfinished 
Business risk priorities study with a wide-ranging attempt to examine 
and recommend changes in the agency’s priorities, based on the 
“relative risks” of all the present and potential environmental issues 
 
 61.  The Indoor Radon Abatement Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C § 2665 (2006). 
 62.  KATHY MCCAULEY ET AL., CROSSING THE AISLE TO CLEANER AIR: HOW THE 
BIPARTISAN “PROJECT 88” TRANSFORMED ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 19 (2008), available at 
http://www.iop.pitt.edu/documents/casestudies/Crossing%20the%20Aisle%20to%20Cleaner%2
0Air.pdf. 
 63.  WHITE HOUSE OFFICE ON ENVTL. POLICY, PROTECTING AMERICA’S WETLANDS: A 
FAIR, FLEXIBLE, AND EFFECTIVE APPROACH (1993), available at http:// 
www.wetlands.com/fed/aug93wet.htm (no net loss); George Herbert Walker Bush, President, 
Speech at Helena, Mont. (1989), available at http://www.rep.org/news/GEvol8/ 
ge8.1_Bush41.html. 
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within its sphere of responsibility. They concluded, for instance, that 
hazardous waste cleanups were significantly overfunded compared to 
more serious hazards to public health and the environment such as 
climate change.64 Reilly’s goal was to try to persuade Congress to 
allow EPA to manage, innovate, and change based on risk priorities 
across its programs, and to address new hazards as they arose, rather 
than just continue to implement the statutory and judicial mandates 
of the 1970s. Reilly’s EPA also endeavored to demonstrate EPA’s 
commitment to science-based priorities in response to “junk science” 
claims by opponents of its regulatory initiatives.65 Unfortunately, most 
of these priority changes could not be implemented without 
congressional approval and Congress itself was too fragmented both 
by partisanship and by separate subcommittees to approve them. The 
report thus did not have as much impact on policies and priorities as 
was hoped. 
A crowning environmental achievement of the George H.W. 
Bush administration, however, was the passage of the landmark 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 with their pioneering “cap and 
trade” innovation in air pollution control. This statute set stringent 
caps on total sulfur and nitrogen emissions from the nation’s electric 
power plants and authorized the EPA to issue tradable allowances 
that the utilities could either use themselves or sell to others if they 
could reduce their own emissions more cheaply.66 Environmental 
groups had long been skeptical of such “rights to pollute,” as had 
many traditionalist EPA regulators, but it proved to be the single 
most successful policy to date in effectively and significantly reducing 
air pollution emissions.67 It also became the exemplar for subsequent 
cap-and-trade proposals, including the European Union carbon-
trading scheme devised under the Kyoto Protocol68—despite 
nonparticipation by the U.S.—and a greenhouse-gas reduction bill 
 
 64.  U.S. ENVTL. PROT, AGENCY, REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES AND 
STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 13 (1990). http://yosemite.epa.gov/ 
sab/sabproduct.nsf/28704D9C420FCBC1852573360053C692/$File/REDUCING+RISK++++++
++++EC-90-021_90021_5-11-1995_204.pdf 
 65.  Leslie Roberts, Counting on Science at EPA, 249 SCIENCE 616 (1990). 
 66.  Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399. 
 67.  David Malakoff, Taking the Sting Out of Acid Rain, 330 SCIENCE 910 (2010). 
 68.  William B. Bonvillian, Time for Climate Plan B, ISSUES SCI. & TECH. ONLINE, Winter 
2011, http://www.issues.org/27.2/bonvillian.html (noting that permit-trading mechanism of the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 was brought by the United States to Kyoto). 
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which passed the U.S. House in 2009 but failed in the Senate.69 The 
1990 amendments also included other aggressive air pollution control 
policies, including technology-based requirements for reducing 
hazardous air pollutant emissions and a “bump-up” provision 
subjecting states that were not complying with the national ambient 
air quality standards to automatically more stringent and costly 
consequences.70 
Reilly also exacted a $1 billion settlement from the Exxon 
Corporation for its Exxon Valdez oil spill in the Gulf of Alaska—the 
largest environmental criminal damage settlement in history up to 
that point.71 But without additional statutory authority such as the 
1990 CAA cap-and-trade program, EPA could not promulgate 
alternative market-oriented tools such as environmental taxes and 
fees or cap-and-trade systems.72 
In the absence of congressional support for additional initiatives, 
therefore, the EPA under Reilly initiated a wide range of voluntary 
programs to promote and reward positive environmental initiatives 
and best practices by leading businesses, in hopes of making them 
models for others. One example was the 33/50 program, which 
challenged businesses to reduce their use of toxic chemicals by 33% 
by 1992 and 50% by 1995 against a 1988 baseline.73 Another was the 
Energy Star program, which offered a positive environmental label—
first for personal computers and monitors, later for all types of 
 
 69.  See H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009) (titled the American Clean Energy and Security 
Act, and also known as the Waxman-Markey bill, after its sponsors); Penny Crossman, Is 
Carbon Trading the Next Big Thing?, WALL STREET & TECH. (July 19, 2009), http:// 
www.wallstreetandtech.com/electronic-trading/218501208 (noting that the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990 introduced the first national cap-and-trade program in the world and 
connecting that development to the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009). 
 70.  Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, §§ 301–06 (Title III, Hazardous Air Pollutants); 
id. § 179, 104 Stat. 2420. 
 71.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Exxon to Pay Record One Billion Dollars in 
Criminal Fines and Civil Damages in Connection with Alaskan Oil Spill (March 13, 1991), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/valdez/02.html. 
 72.  One of its most significant recent innovations, for instance, the 2005 Clean Air 
Interstate Rule, which would have created an emissions-reduction cap and permit market for 
sulfur and nitrogen emissions across the whole eastern half of the country, was remanded to the 
Agency by a court decision as lacking statutory authority (although left in place pending 
refinements), even though it would probably have greatly benefited economic efficiency in 
industries as well as cleaner air. See JOHN GRAHAM, BUSH ON THE HOME FRONT 209 (2010). It 
was subsequently replaced in 2011 by the even stronger Cross-State Air Pollution Rule 
(CSAPR). 76 Fed. Reg. 48208, August 8, 2011. 
 73.  DANIEL J. FIORINO, THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 134 (2006); U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-745-R-99-004, 33/50 PROGRAM: THE FINAL RECORD 1 (1999), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/3350/3350-fnl.pdf. 
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appliances and even for homes—affirming that the labeled product 
uses significantly less energy than comparable alternative products.74 
One final environmental outcome of George H.W. Bush’s 
presidency was the adoption of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),75 which Bush signed and 
the U.S. Senate ratified in 1992, although only after the Bush 
administration had successfully insisted on removing from it all 
binding targets.76 Often overlooked in favor of its more contentious 
sequel, the Kyoto Protocol, the UNFCCC did not include binding 
greenhouse gas reduction targets, but it did explicitly commit the U.S. 
to acknowledgement of global warming as a serious environmental 
threat and of the responsibility of the industrialized countries to take 
the lead in reducing it. It thus provided an important basis, in addition 
to the Clean Air Act itself, for EPA’s responsibility to address this 
issue. Reilly was not able, however, to persuade Bush to sign the 
international convention on biodiversity; and other pledges such as no 
net loss of wetlands also have never been fully achieved. 
VIII.  PARTISAN “SWINGS OF THE PENDULUM” 
Bush’s loss in 1992 to Bill Clinton and the outspoken 
environmental champion Al Gore probably reconfirmed in the minds 
of Republican politicians the likelihood that Democratic candidates 
would always have an advantage over Republicans on environmental 
issues. This led Republican strategists instead to redouble their 
determination to change the subject, to reframe the issues as 
opposition to big government and burdensome federal regulation 
and, in the process, attract major campaign funding from businesses 
opposed to environmental regulations. Both Newt Gingrich and the 
Republican congressional insurgents in 1994 followed this course, as 
did President George W. Bush with Vice President Dick Cheney from 
2000 to 2008. 
 
 74.  Will Nixon, Uncle Sam’s Green Wallet: Will Federal Spending Support Environmental 
Technologies?, E: THE ENVTL. MAG., Sept.–Oct. 1993, at 24 (describing the early Energy Star 
program, which involved only 13 computer manufacturers); Major Milestones, 
ENERGYSTAR.GOV, http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=about.ab_milestones (last visited 
Sept. 10, 2011). 
 75.  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty 
Doc No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107. 
 76.  Michael Weisskopf, Bush Was Aloof in Warming Debate; Climate Treaty Offers View 
of President’s Role in Complex Policy, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1992, at A1. 
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Clinton himself was more a centrist than a committed 
environmentalist at the outset of his presidency, although he did take 
several early environmental initiatives. He sought early on to elevate 
EPA to the status of a Cabinet department, for instance, but this 
legislative proposal failed due to the addition of amendments in the 
House and Senate by conservative opponents of the bill. The House 
amendment—proposed by Representatives Mica, a Republican, and 
Thurman, a Democrat—would have required EPA to conduct cost–
benefit analyses and risk assessments on all rules it imposed on local 
governments. Supporters of the amendment lauded it as a way of 
reducing unfunded mandates.77 A similar amendment to the Senate 
version of the bill was proposed by Democratic Senator J. Bennett 
Johnston.78 The amendments were unacceptable to environmental 
advocates of the legislation.79 
Clinton also sought early on to create nonpartisan, multi-
stakeholder processes to negotiate solutions to thorny environmental 
issues. Early in his presidency, he sponsored several high-profile 
negotiation processes to try to resolve environmental controversies 
such as the water quality protection for the Everglades; the old-
growth forests of the Pacific Northwest; and habitat conservation 
agreements for endangered species.80 
This attempt to foster a spirit of multi-stakeholder negotiation 
for environmental issues was, in effect, rebuffed by the midterm 
elections in 1994, in which a strongly ideological, anti-government 
Republican insurgency led by Newt Gingrich took control of 
Congress.81 Gingrich and his fellow Republican candidates 
 
 77.  Gary Lee, House Leaders Defer Vote on Cabinet Rank for EPA; GOP Opposition to 
Clinton Measure Growing, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 1993, at A4 (describing both the proposal and 
the cost-benefit amendment intended to stymie it); Mary-Margaret Larmouth, Cities Flex 
Muscles on Mandates, NATION’S CITIES WKLY., Feb. 7, 1994, at 1. 
 78.  See Janet O. Wiener, Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Analyses: In the Public 
Interest?, 101 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 408 (1993). 
 79.  See, e.g., Mike Mills, EPA Cabinet Measure Hits Snag over Amendment, CONG. Q. 
WKLY., Feb. 5, 1994, at 241 (quoting the chief legal counsel of the National Audubon Society as 
saying that the amendment, and the necessity of pulling the bill altogether, was “very 
disappointing”).  See also Wiener, supra note 78, at 409 (“Most environmental groups oppose all 
forms of risk assessment legislation . . . . The National Wildlife Federation says the Johnston 
[amendment] would ‘add a costly new layer of bureaucracy that will delay important 
environmental regulations.’ David Driesen of the Natural Resources Defense Council says that 
‘while comparative risk analysis sounds attractive in theory, it doesn’t work very well in practice 
and has sometimes paralyzed environmental programs.’ . . . Rick Hinds of Greenpeace says ‘risk 
assessment is a voodoo science of politicians to let pollution occur.’”) 
 80.  ANDREWS, supra note 1, 350–59. 
 81.  Id. 
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campaigned on a platform widely advertised as a “Contract with 
America,” in which the intent to vigorously attack environmental 
regulation was masked by almost Orwellian language; the bill was 
called the “Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act.”82 
Once faced with an outspokenly anti-environmental Congress 
after 1994, Clinton defined himself as a far stronger champion of 
environmental protection, thereby gaining support from the public—
with the exceptions of regulated industries and Western public land 
users—at the expense of the Republican insurgents.83 
For EPA administrator, Clinton appointed Carol Browner, 
former Secretary of Florida’s Department of Environmental 
Regulation and former legislative director to then-Senator Al Gore.84 
Browner brought to the EPA an aggressive commitment to tough 
rulemaking and regulatory enforcement for environmental health 
protection, and became the longest-serving administrator in EPA’s 
history, holding the position from 1993 to 2001.85 During her tenure, 
she reorganized EPA’s enforcement programs into a single Office of 
Enforcement and Compliance Assistance, and promoted several 
initiatives to negotiate pollution prevention partnerships with key 
industrial sectors, including Project XL and the Common Sense 
Initiative, both elements of Clinton’s “Reinventing Government” 
effort.86 With Clinton’s support she also established new initiatives at 
EPA on children’s environmental health and environmental justice.87 
 
 82.  Despite its title, the content of this proposed legislation consisted primarily of 
proposals requiring risk assessments and cost–benefit analyses for all major environmental 
regulations, specifying in detail how such assessments were to be conducted, setting an overall 
“regulatory budget” for the maximum cost of all new regulations in a given year (without 
respect to their benefits), requiring detailed “regulatory impact assessments,” and mandating 
compensation for any reduction in property value resulting from limitation of its use by federal 
regulation, among other mandates. See Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act of 1995, S. 
6221, 104th Cong. (1995). 
 83.  ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 351–59. 
 84.  Carol M. Browner: Biography, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Feb. 1998), http:// 
www.epa.gov/aboutepa/history/admin/agency/browner.html [hereinafter Browner Biography]. 
 85.  Press Release, League of Conservation Voters, League of Conservation Voters 
Welcomes Carol Browner to the Board of Directors (June 23, 2011), available at 
http://www.lcv.org/media/press-releases/League-of-Conservation-Voters-Welcomes-Carol-
Browner-to-the-Board-of-Directors.html. 
 86.  Carol M. Browner, Foreword: The Role of Private Parties in Resolving Public 
Problems, 18 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 447, 449–50 (1997); SUSAN HUNTER & RICHARD W. 
WATERMAN, ENFORCING THE LAW: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN WATER ACTS 221 (1996). 
 87.  Exec. Order 12,898: Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority 
Populations and Low-Income Populations, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994); Exec. Order 
13,045: Protection of Children from Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks, 62 Fed. Reg. 
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In addition, she successfully fought off attempts by the 1994 
Republican Congress to roll back EPA’s regulatory powers.88 
Browner also began EPA’s successful program to revitalize 
contaminated “brownfield” sites,89 and skillfully and successfully 
championed tightening of federal air quality standards for ground-
level ozone and particulates as well as for emissions from light trucks 
and sport utility vehicles.90 Finally, she began to lay the foundations 
for EPA regulation of greenhouse gas emissions, despite bipartisan 
congressional opposition to any U.S. climate change action that did 
not include binding commitments by rapidly industrializing countries 
such as China.91 The few bipartisan successes of this era were 1996 
pre-election amendments to the Food and Drug Act; amendments 
that abolished the “Delaney Amendment,” which had prohibited any 
carcinogenic additives in food, and in exchange required toxicity 
testing for additives’ effects on children as well as adults;92 and 
amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act.93 Some Republicans 
from Northeastern downwind states also supported the more 
stringent ozone and particulate standards.94 
Browner’s emphasis on strict enforcement, however, was 
particularly controversial with respect to “new source review” (NSR), 
the requirement that pre-existing industrial sources of air pollution 
upgrade to technology that met the tougher Clean Air Act standards 
for new sources whenever they underwent major modifications.95 
Electric utilities in particular preferred to manage these older sources 
under the “cap and trade” scheme of the 1990 Clean Air Act, which 
 
19,885, 19,885 (Apr. 23, 1997); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 1993 ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
INITIATIVE (1993), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ej/resources/reports/annual-
project-reports/ej_annual_report_1993.pdf; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE EPA 
CHILDREN’S ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH YEARBOOK (1998), available at http:// 
yosemite.epa.gov/ochp/ochpweb.nsf/content/pdf5.htm/%24File/ochpyearbook.pdf. 
 88.  Browner Biography, supra note 84. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  John H. Cushman Jr., On Clean Air, Environmental Chief Fought Doggedly, and Won, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/05/us/on-clean-air-environmental-
chief-fought-doggedly-and-won.html; Warren Brown & Martha Hamilton, EPA to Require 
Cleaner Fuels; Light Trucks, SUVs Must Meet Same Emission Standard as Cars, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 21, 1999, at A1. 
 91.  See S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997). 
 92.  ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 358. 
 93.  Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, 110 Stat. 1613. 
 94.  Cushman, supra note 90. 
 95.  Peter Van Doren & Jerry Taylor, Congress vs. Responsibility: New Source Review 
Problems Are on Capitol Hill, NAT’L REV., Dec. 8, 2003, http://old.nationalreview.com/ 
comment/vandorentaylor200312080926.asp. 
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only regulated total emissions rather than requiring strict compliance 
by every facility. Strict NSR enforcement, from the perspective of the 
utilities, undermined the more flexible cap-and-trade system and was 
far more costly. From the perspective of Browner’s enforcement 
office, however, some utilities had been flouting the NSR 
requirement for years, continuing to upgrade old coal-fired power 
plants and use them more intensively without installing the best 
available technology as mandated by the original Clean Air Act. 
Browner’s EPA filed 51 enforcement suits over this issue in the 
closing years of the Clinton administration, most of them against coal-
fired power plants.96 Her aggressive enforcement stance on this issue 
led many industries to support George W. Bush for election in 2000 
over Al Gore and to lobby for more aggressive Republican initiatives 
to rein in EPA.97 
IX.  ANOTHER ANTI-REGULATORY ERA: EPA UNDER GEORGE W. 
BUSH 
The 2000 presidential election clearly reconfirmed environmental 
protection as a partisan issue, with high-profile environmental 
champion Al Gore as the Democratic nominee and George W. Bush, 
heavily supported by industries that were chafing under the Clinton 
EPA’s aggressive regulatory and enforcement policies, as the 
Republican candidate. Bush had made a campaign pledge to require 
all power plants to meet federal standards for carbon dioxide as well 
as sulfur, nitrogen and mercury, but once in office, he both withdrew 
the U.S. from participation in international greenhouse gas reduction 
negotiations and reversed his pledge to regulate carbon dioxide 
emissions.98 
The Bush administration’s record at EPA was, with a few 
important exceptions, one of the low points of the agency’s history. 
Bush’s first appointee as EPA administrator was Christine Todd 
Whitman, the moderate Republican governor of New Jersey.99 In 
retrospect, Whitman’s appointment appears to have been a token 
appointment of a woman from the moderate Northeastern wing of 
the Republican Party. Whitman resigned within two years after being 
 
 96.  GRAHAM, supra note 72, at 201. 
 97.  Bruce Barcott, Changing All the Rules, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 4, 2004, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/04/magazine/04BUSH.html?pagewanted=all. 
 98.  ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 360–61. 
 99.  Christine Todd Whitman: Biography, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (2001), http:// 
www.epa.gov/aboutepa/history/admin/agency/whitman.html. 
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repeatedly undercut by the White House when defending and seeking 
to carry out what she had taken as his campaign commitments.100 
Whitman was followed as administrator by Michael Leavitt, a former 
governor of Utah who had been considered an effective 
environmental manager at the state level and soon went on to 
become Secretary of Health and Human Services.101 Leavitt was 
succeeded by Stephen Johnson, a career professional from within 
EPA who proved to be more a malleable subordinate for the White 
House’s policies than a strong independent administrator in the 
tradition of Ruckelshaus.102 
During Administrator Leavitt’s tenure, the agency strengthened 
its standards for ozone and other air pollutants and, in particular, 
implemented tougher standards for diesel emissions from both on- 
and off-road vehicles—the former begun under the Clinton 
administration—a major new step forward in air pollution control.103 
In 2005, EPA introduced the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), a 
pathbreaking proposal, albeit with controversial timelines, to create a 
cap-and-trade system for sulfur and nitrogen emissions covering the 
entire eastern half of the country.104 CAIR was remanded to the EPA 
by the courts for refinements needed to pass judicial scrutiny, but was 
left in place in the meantime.105 A controversial rule on reducing 
mercury emissions from power plants, called the Clean Air Mercury 
 
 100.  The immediate reason for her resignation, as she confirmed in a later interview, was 
being directed by Vice President Dick Cheney to essentially exempt old coal-fired power plants 
from new source review requirements, a policy change that was later overturned by the courts. 
See Jo Becker & Barton Gellman, Leaving No Tracks, WASH. POST, June 27, 2007, at A1. 
Whitman subsequently authored a poignant book entitled It’s My Party, Too, lamenting the 
Republican Party’s abdication of commitment to environmental issues. CHRISTINE TODD 
WHITMAN, IT’S MY PARTY, TOO: THE BATTLE FOR THE HEART OF THE GOP AND THE 
FUTURE OF AMERICA (2005). 
 101.  Biography of Mike Leavitt, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.¸ http:// 
www.hhs.gov/secretary/dhhssec.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2011). 
 102.  Cf. John Shiffman & John Sullivan, An Eroding Mission at EPA, PHILA. INQUIRER, 
Dec. 7, 2008, http://articles.philly.com/2008-12-07/news/24992895_1_climate-change-climate-
change-deputy-administrator-jason-burnett. 
 103.  Michael Janofsky, New EPA Rules to Cut Diesel Soot / Regulations for Nonroad 
Vehicles Require Cleaner Fuel, Slashing Emissions by 90%, S.F. CHRON., May 11, 2004, 
http://articles.sfgate.com/2004-05-11/news/17424399_1_diesel-fuel-new-diesel-trucks-that-use-
diesel. 
 104.  Clean Air Interstate Rule: Basic Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http:// 
www.epa.gov/cair/basic.html (last updated July 9, 2010). 
 105.  North Carolina v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 05-1244 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 23, 2008) 
(order remanding CAIR to EPA without vacatur). See also GRAHAM, supra note 72, at 207–09. 
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Rule, was also proposed.106 Positive features of the proposed rule 
would have included a permanent nationwide cap on total mercury 
emissions, but this approach would also have left open the risk of 
“hot spots” of toxic pollution at some facilities and unacceptably long 
compliance deadlines.107 This proposal too was overturned by the 
courts.108 EPA also introduced a vigorous program for cleaning up 
contaminated “brownfields” sites and stepped up the Energy Star 
voluntary energy efficiency certification program.109 
On other important issues, however, Bush’s EPA was dominated 
by White House pressure against strong environmental regulation, 
especially of the fossil fuel industries and their users. Led by Vice 
President Dick Cheney and the Interior Department, the Bush 
administration pursued aggressive policies of accelerated oil and gas 
leasing throughout the public lands and promoted new investments in 
coal production and use.110 EPA enforcement actions dropped 
dramatically.111 In 2002 EPA issued a highly controversial new 
interpretation of the NSR regulations that would, in effect, 
permanently exempt old “grandfathered” industrial air polluters from 
ever having to upgrade to modern air pollution standards; this policy 
 
 106.  Clean Air Mercury Rule, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/ 
oar/mercuryrule/ (last updated Mar. 16, 2011). 
 107.  Regulating mercury as a hazardous air pollutant under section 112 of the Clean Air 
Act could be done immediately using known control technologies; the proposed EPA Clean Air 
Mercury Rule would instead have introduced a two-phase cap-and-trade program that would 
not be fully mandatory until 2018, with full reductions not expected until 2026. Nine States Sue 
EPA Seeking Tougher Mercury Rule, ENV’T NEWS SERV. http://www.ens-
newswire.com/ens/mar2005/2005-03-31-03.asp (last visited Nov. 17, 2011); Fact Sheet: EPA’s 
Clean Air Mercury Rule, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/oar/mercuryrule/factsheetfin.html (last updated Mar. 16, 2011); OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2006-P-00025, MONITORING NEEDED TO 
ASSESS IMPACT OF EPA’S CLEAN AIR MERCURY RULE ON POTENTIAL HOTSPOTS (2006), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2006/20060515-2006-P-00025.pdf. 
 108.  New Jersey v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 517 F.3d 574 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (vacating the 
Clean Air Mercury Rule). See also GRAHAM, supra note 72, at 210–14. 
 109.  ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 379. 
 110.  According to Graham, by 2004 the Department of Energy projected that the U.S. 
would have built 72 new coal-fired power plants, compared to zero projected in 1999; and by 
2006 another 100 plants were under consideration, although by 2008 these numbers had been 
significantly reduced due to public backlash, lawsuits, and rising construction costs. GRAHAM, 
supra note 72, at 136–37. 
 111.  Seth Borenstein, Pollution Citations Plummet under Bush, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 9, 
2003, http://articles.philly.com/2003-12-09/news/25469611_1_epa-administrator-mike-leavitt-
bush-epa-pollution-citations. 
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was subsequently overturned by the courts.112 In Appalachia, the Bush 
EPA approved rules that reversed Clean Water Act restrictions on 
dumping mine waste into streams, now allowing such dumping so 
long as harm was minimized “to the extent practicable” and was 
compensated for somewhere else.113 And the Bush administration 
tightened standards for motor vehicle fuel efficiency only marginally, 
far less than needed to have significant benefits.114 
On climate change, Bush withdrew the U.S. from participation in 
international climate change negotiations and personally dismissed a 
major EPA scientific report on climate change as just another “report 
put out by the bureaucracy.”115 The climate change section of EPA’s 
scientific Draft Report on the Environment, released in 2003, was 
heavily edited by a former industry lobbyist in the Executive Office116 
and ultimately withheld by Administrator Whitman rather than being 
published in politically edited form.117 Many other EPA reports were 
also said to have been subjected to political editing.118 EPA’s legal 
 
 112.  GRAHAM, supra note 72, at 201–04; KIM CONNOLLY & VICTOR FLATT, CTR. FOR 
PROGRESSIVE REGULATION, ‘GRANDFATHERED’ AIR POLLUTION SOURCES AND POLLUTION 
CONTROL: NEW SOURCE REVIEW UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT (2005), available at http:// 
www.progressivereform.org/articles/NSR_504.pdf 
 113.  Excess Spoil, Coal Mine Waste, and Buffers for Perennial and Intermittent Streams, 73 
Fed. Reg. 75, 814, 75,814 (Dec. 12, 2008); Juliet Eilperin, EPA to Scrutinize Permits for 
Mountaintop-Removal Mining, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR2009032401607.html; Deborah Zaborenko, EPA Eases 
Rule on Mountaintop Coal Mining Debris, REUTERS, Dec. 3, 2008, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/12/03/us-coal-mountaintop-idUSTRE4B267F20081203. 
 114.  The mileage standards announced in March 2006 would have required an increase in 
the average fuel economy for passenger trucks only from 22.2 miles per gallon to 23.5 miles per 
gallon by 2010. Court Throws Out Bush Fuel Economy Standards, ENVTL. NEWS SERV., Nov. 
16, 2007, http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/nov2007/2007-11-16-02.html. Bush did subsequently 
propose a standard of 34 mpg for cars and light trucks by 2017, but did not implement this in 
regulations before the end of his term. John Hughes & Roger Runningen, Bush Plans Rules to 
Boost Auto Fuel-Economy Standards (Update 1), BLOOMBERG NEWS, May 14, 2007,  
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aVMYPLuwm.LU&refer=home; 
U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Statement on Corporate Fuel Economy Standards Finalization (Jan. 7, 
2009), available at http://www.dot.gov/affairs/dot0109.htm. 
 115.  Lloyd De Vries, Bush Disses Global Warming Report, CBS NEWS, June 4, 2002, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/06/03/tech/main510920.shtml. 
 116.  Philip Cooney, formerly of the American Petroleum Institute, then chief of staff of the 
president’s Council on Environmental Quality; subsequently employed by ExxonMobil. See 
Jarrett Murphy, White House Guts Global Warming Study, CBS NEWS, June 19, 2003, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/07/24/politics/main564873.shtml. 
 117.  ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 381. 
 118.  See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 600-R-03-050, EPA’s DRAFT REPORT ON THE 
ENVIRONMENT TECHNICAL DOCUMENT (2003). For additional examples, see UNION OF 
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY IN POLICYMAKING: AN INVESTIGATION INTO 
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S MISUSE OF SCIENCE (2004), available at 
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office went on to issue a ruling asserting that the agency did not even 
have legal authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the 
Clean Air Act, a ruling later rejected by the courts119 and reversed by 
the Obama administration.120 Additionally, Administrator Stephen 
Johnson denied California’s request for a waiver allowing it to 
regulate tailpipe emissions of greenhouse gases, an action that also 
was subsequently challenged in the courts.121 
X. REAFFIRMATION OF EPA’S MISSION: THE OBAMA 
ADMINISTRATION 
Since January 2009, the Obama administration has once again 
put highly experienced and committed regulators in charge of EPA. 
The agency is currently led by Administrator Lisa Jackson, a chemical 
engineer and former Commissioner of New Jersey’s Department of 
Environmental Protection and, before that, a 16-year EPA veteran.122 
Jackson’s stated goal has been to “restore momentum to EPA’s core 
programs—healthier air and water, and reduced risks from toxic 
substances—while also tackling emerging challenges such as climate 
change.”123 In her first two years, she reversed the Bush EPA’s 
 
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/scientific_integrity/rsi_final_fullreport_1.pdf; UNION OF 
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY IN POLICYMAKING: FURTHER 
INVESTIGATION OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S MISUSE OF SCIENCE (2004), available at 
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/scientific_integrity/scientific_integrity_in_policy_makin
g_july_2004_1.pdf; and U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT 
REFORM—MINORITY STAFF, POLITICS AND SCIENCE IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2003), 
available at http://it.stlawu.edu/~vleh/Bush%20Politics%20Science.pdf. 
 119.  Massachusetts v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). The decision overruled 
the Bush EPA’s position, holding that the Clean Air Act did indeed authorize it to regulate 
tailpipe emissions of greenhouse gases as hazards to the public health and welfare. 
 120.  Acting on the basis of the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 
at 497, EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson issued findings that greenhouse gases were a threat to 
public health and welfare, and that tailpipe emissions contribute to this threat. Proposed 
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Finding for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) 
of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886 (Apr. 24, 2009). 
 121.  California v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 07-1457, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 29095 
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 11, 2007); California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of 
Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 and Subsequent 
Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156 
(Mar. 6, 2008); Press Release, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, Gov. Schwarzenegger 
Announces Intent to Appeal Denial of California’s Tailpipe Emissions Waiver Request (Dec. 
20, 2007), available at http://www.cleancarscampaign.org/web-content/newsroom/docs/Schwarz-
Appeal-12-20-07.pdf. 
 122.  Administrator Lisa P. Jackson, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/ 
aboutepa/administrator.html (last updated June 15, 2011). 
 123.  Progress Report, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Apr. 29, 2009), http://epa.gov/progress/. 
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position on climate change, agreeing with the Supreme Court that 
EPA has both the authority and the responsibility to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions, and issued draft regulations to begin that 
process as well as creating a mandatory greenhouse gas reporting 
registry for all major sources.124 She also issued draft regulations 
restricting mercury emissions from cement kilns and coal-fired power 
plants.125 In 2010, she severely tightened standards for mountaintop-
mining impacts on water quality, and, in 2011, for the first time, 
cancelled a major mountaintop-mining permit,126 telegraphing a 
significantly stronger position on the Clean Water Act’s mandate to 
protect water quality. After a significant spill from a coal ash storage 
pond, she proposed more stringent new regulations on coal ash 
disposal as well.127 Finally, she administered a major increase in 
funding under the Obama Administration’s economic recovery 
stimulus funding—the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act—
for a wide range of initiatives, including community drinking-water 
and water-quality infrastructure projects, brownfield restoration 
initiatives, additional Superfund site and underground storage tank 
cleanups, and diesel emission reduction investments.128  
Taken as a whole, many of these policies represented a 
particularly strong reversal of the Bush administration’s policies 
promoting the coal industry, significantly raising the cost of coal to 
reflect more of its full environmental costs and thus reducing its 
advantage relative to environmentally more benign renewable energy 
sources. 
 
 124.  See supra note 120. 
 125.  Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Sets First National Limits to Reduce 
Mercury and Other Toxic Emissions from Cement Plants (Aug. 9, 2010), available at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/e77fdd4f5afd88a3852576b3005a604f/ef62ba1cb3c8079
b8525777a005af9a5!OpenDocument; Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS) for Power 
Plants, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/airquality/powerplanttoxics/ (last 
updated July 28, 2011). 
 126.  John M. Broder, Agency Revokes Permit for Major Coal Mining Project, N.Y. TIMES,  
Jan. 13, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/14/science/earth/14coal.html?pagewanted=all; 
Kris Maher & Siobhan Hughes, EPA Toughens Mining Permits, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303960604575158032996638508.html.. 
 127.  Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System; Identification and Listing of Special 
Wastes; Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,128 
(June 21, 2010). As of October 2011, the rule had not yet been finalized. 
 128.  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT 
QUARTERLY PERFORMANCE REPORT, CUMULATIVE RESULTS AS OF JUNE 30, 2011 (2011), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/recovery/pdfs/ARRA-FY11-Quarter-3-Performance-
Report.pdf. 
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As a pattern, these policies also represented a dramatic new 
“swing of the pendulum” from the laxity of the Bush administration 
back toward a more vigorous rulemaking and enforcement policy for 
environmental protection. With the election of a far more strongly 
anti-government, Republican-led House of Representatives in 2010, 
however, the new majority, including some Democrats from fossil-
fuel-dependent states, threatened legislation to limit EPA’s powers to 
carry out many of these proposals or, failing that, to hamstring the 
agency through budget cuts and constant oversight hearings.129 Only 
time will tell which if any of these measures will be approved by the 
Senate and the president, and when and on what issues, if any, a 
working bipartisan consensus can be achieved on strong and stable 
environmental performance expectations. 
XI. DISCUSSION 
In short, EPA at 40 has accomplished a great deal and has 
generated proposals for a variety of further innovations, but remains 
fundamentally constrained within the regulatory frameworks and 
fragmented authorities of the 1970s due to the loss of bipartisanship, 
trust and shared commitment to its mission among the members and 
factions of Congress. EPA has significantly improved the overall 
quality of the air we breathe, vastly improved waste management 
practices, removed lead and stratospheric ozone-depleting chemicals 
from the air and significantly reduced pollution discharges from point 
sources into both air and water.130 It also has attempted to generate 
innovative methods to improve both economic efficiency and 
environmental outcomes, such as emissions trading. However, these 
successes are highly imperfect and vulnerable to changes in 
administration. The agency still does not have an overarching 
framework of authority and tools to protect the environment and set 
priorities more generally, let alone a broader mission to help achieve 
an economy that is environmentally sustainable. 
 
 129.  U.S. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS—DEMOCRATS, LEGISLATIVE RIDERS 
AND FUNDING LIMITATIONS IN H.R. 2584 INTERIOR, ENVIRONMENT, AND RELATED 
AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS, FY12 (2011), http://democrats.appropriations.house.gov/images/ 
Special_Interest_List_Interior_Appropriations.pdf; House GOP Passes Bill Targeting EPA 
Regulations, FOX NEWS, Sept. 23, 2011, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/09/23/house-gop-
passes-bill-targeting-epa-regulations/. 
 130.  See generally J.C. DAVIES & J. MAZUREK, POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE UNITED 
STATES: EVALUATING THE SYSTEM (1998). 
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As a result, important threats to the environment remain 
unsolved and unmanaged. Among the most obvious examples are 
water pollution from non-point sources, aggregate motor vehicle 
emissions, grandfathered pre-existing power plants and industrial 
facilities, wetland destruction and continued urbanization of other 
ecologically valuable natural lands, continuing uncertainty over 
whether Congress will undercut its nascent regulation of greenhouse 
gas emissions, and the absence of effective approaches to new hazards 
such as nanomaterials. 
Despite perennial calls for better science, EPA’s risk-based 
regulatory programs have ironically been among its least effective, 
largely because they are vulnerable to unending debate and 
politicization of the assumptions used in the science itself. 
Politically, as a regulatory agency, EPA’s most active 
constituencies are those businesses that would be most affected by its 
regulations, particularly those that would be required to retrofit 
existing facilities to comply with new regulations and are seeking to 
avoid the costs of change. EPA’s constituencies also include firms 
that benefit from its regulations, such as emissions-control equipment 
manufacturers and the ethanol industry, but also more generally, 
those businesses that simply want to maintain the status quo, 
including those that have already litigated the existing regulations and 
invested in complying with them and do not want competitors to 
escape these costs. These businesses are implicitly allies of 
environmental groups protecting the status quo, but not necessarily of 
those seeking more efficient or more effective reforms. 
The main constituencies in favor of EPA’s mission of more 
effective environmental protection include a few organized 
environmental advocacy groups who wish to do more than simply 
protect existing statutes and regulations; innovative “green” 
enterprises and renewable-energy producers seeking to grow their 
businesses; in many instances (though not all), the courts; and in 
principle, the general public, to the extent that the public can be 
galvanized intermittently into active pressure by environmental crises 
reported in the media, or by threats to the basic legislation of 
environmental protection as an election issue. In 2006, for instance, 
environmental advocates helped defeat one of the most outspokenly 
extreme anti-regulatory Republican House leaders, Richard Pombo, 
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in an ostensibly safe district in California,131 but the general public is 
notoriously difficult to keep mobilized and is especially vulnerable to 
other fears and priorities, such as terrorism and economic downturns. 
In the 2010 election, environmental voting appears to have been 
eclipsed by other issues and made little significant difference to the 
electoral outcomes.132 
For the present, it is clear that any hope of significant 
environmental policy reform in Congress continues to be held 
hostage to bitter partisan gridlock, demonstrated most clearly in 
Congress’s failure to enact any climate change legislation in 2009 or 
thereafter. It is just as clear that EPA, with all the limitations as well 
as the strengths of its statutory authorities, therefore remains the 
nation’s key hope for action to protect the environment and public 
health from harmful pollutants.  
With each recent change in presidential party affiliation, 
however, EPA’s policies have been subjected to exaggerated “swings 
of the pendulum” between aggressiveness and laxity, based on the 
ideological polarization of the two major parties on this issue and the 
demonization of environmental protection policy as an element of the 
anti-government core ideology that now dominates the Republican 
party. The conflation of these issues, and the resulting congressional 
gridlock and executive policy volatility on environmental protection 
policy, have arguably been as harmful to businesses as to the 
environment. This represents a pattern that serves neither the 
environment nor even the business community well. 
Under all administrations, moreover, there has been a large 
disparity between EPA’s mandates and its funding. In real terms, 
EPA’s budget in 2010 was barely above what it was in 1992, despite 
its increased responsibilities, and this disparity is likely to continue if 
not increase given the growing federal budget deficit and resulting 
restrictions on discretionary domestic spending.133 
In short, EPA’s most serious unsolved problems and deficiencies 
are congressionally imposed: they cannot be solved without 
 
 131.  See Bettina Boxall, Environmentalists Savor Pombo Defeat as Sign of Power, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, http://articles.latimes.com/2006/nov/09/local/me-defenders9. 
 132.  Jeffrey Jones, In U.S., Many Environmental Issues at 20-Year-Low Concern, GALLUP 
(Mar. 16, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/126716/environmental-issues-year-low-
concern.aspx. 
 133.  ROBERT ESWORTHY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41149, ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA): APPROPRIATIONS FOR FY2011, at 31 fig.B-1 (2010), available at 
http://cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/10Jun/R41149.pdf. 
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congressional will to pursue a greener economy, both by deploying 
market-oriented regulatory tools and removing perverse subsidies 
and other incentives that continue to protect environmentally 
damaging—and economically anachronistic—practices of an earlier 
era. 
This continued congressional gridlock represents as much a split 
in the business community as it does a partisan and ideological divide. 
The split exists between businesses that want to make greener 
investments and need greater certainty about future prices and 
regulatory expectations to do so, and those that want to continue to 
operate older facilities and more environmentally damaging practices. 
It also exists between those who see environmental protection as 
inherently a form of big government to be resisted and reduced, and 
those who advocate ways of achieving environmental protection that 
could also make markets work more efficiently on an 
environmentally sustainable “level playing field;” and between those 
environmental advocates who see business as inherently an enemy to 
be regulated and punished, and others who seek alliances with those 
businesses that could be core partners in creating a greener economy. 
Finally, throughout EPA’s history the courts have played a 
critical role in upholding or reversing EPA’s actions. This role reflects 
complicated cross-cutting considerations. Courts must face questions 
about whether they should uphold strongly environmentally 
protective interpretations of the agencies’ statutes—even in some 
cases in which the agency is the one trying to weaken the statute—
and whether to give broad deference to the agency’s expertise or to 
take their own “hard look” at the substance of the agency’s decisions 
as well as the agency’s procedures in reaching them, an approach 
which has tended to increase the burden of proof on the agency 
before approving environmentally protective regulations.134 
EPA’s statutory mandates to protect the environment have 
frequently been protected and vindicated by the courts, even in cases 
in which the EPA itself has downplayed or sought to weaken them. 
As Schroeder and Glicksman comment, 
Up at least through the 1990s, industry prevailed in nearly half of 
the cases in which it charged that EPA provided an inadequate 
explanation for its decision and both pro-industry and 
proenvironmental litigants succeeded in a remarkably high 
percentage of the cases in which they leveled attacks on EPA’s 
 
 134.  See, e.g., Rita L. Weckler, Case Comment: A “Hard Look” at a Soft Analysis, 
Corrosion Proof Fittings v. Environmental Protection Agency, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 145 (1994). 
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science based on defects in the agency’s explanations for its 
decisions . . . . [At the same time,] the Courts of Appeals during the 
1990s have indeed been wary about making comparative judgments 
and for that reason do not typically question EPA’s evidentiary 
choices or second-guess the agency in its readings of the weight of 
the scientific evidence. . . . [At the same time,] the courts have not 
been hesitant during the past decade to inflict defeat upon EPA 
when the agency provides no evidence at all to support its technical 
determinations, relies on evidence that conflicts with the stated 
views of its own experts, employs technical models or 
methodologies that are obviously ill-suited to assessing the impact 
of the regulated activity on the environment, fails to explain in any 
way an apparently illogical conclusion, is silent in the face of a 
pointed and relevant question about the logic of its reasoning, or 
engages in internally inconsistent reasoning or reasoning that for 
unstated reasons conflicts with the agency’s own previous practice. 
135 
Particularly during George W. Bush’s second term, for instance, 
court decisions repeatedly overruled EPA regulatory proposals to 
weaken environmental regulations, such as NSR, the Clean Air 
Mercury Rule which would have allowed flexible trading in place of 
site-specific controls on this toxic contaminant, some portions of the 
CAIR rule, and notably the Massachusetts v. EPA decision 
confirming EPA’s authority, against the Bush EPA’s wishes, to 
regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act.136 In other cases, 
however, the courts have not always supported the EPA, as evinced 
by a ruling of the conservative Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. Aracoma Coal Co., 
overriding a number of district court decisions that had upheld strict 
EPA regulation of mountaintop removal mining under the Clean 
Water Act.137 
XII. THE NEXT 40 YEARS 
Given this history and EPA’s current imperfect circumstances, 
what should EPA aspire to look like over its next 40 years? 
One would hope, first, for a broader mandate, not simply to 
regulate individual pollutants and facilities, but to lead in 
transforming existing government policies into more effective 
incentives to create a greener, economically efficient, and 
 
 135.  Christopher H. Schroeder & Robert L. Glicksman, Chevron, State Farm and the EPA 
in the Courts of Appeals during the 1990s, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10371 (2001). 
 136.  Cf. GRAHAM, supra note 72, at 220; cf. also Shiffman & Sullivan, supra note 102. 
 137.  556 F.3d 177, 186 (4th Cir. 2009). 
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environmentally sustainable economy. EPA also needs clearer 
authority to lead in addressing global threats to the environment and 
human health as they become increasingly serious. 
Second, and at the very least, EPA needs statutory authority to 
take more integrated approaches across its traditional regulatory 
programs to reduce major pollutants in all their most significant 
environmental media and exposure pathways, especially for 
potentially serious new hazards such as nanomaterials. 
Third, EPA needs authority to deploy a broader and more 
flexible range of policy tools, including, for instance, market-oriented 
incentives, behavioral “nudges,”138 information disclosures, and 
liability, all in a regulatory framework that provides more certainty 
both of environmental performance outcomes and for businesses as 
to what regulations and markets they will face for pollutants and 
other uses of the environment. To do this well, the agency also needs 
clearer authority and increased funding for applied research and 
development on the social and behavioral aspects of solving 
environmental problems, in order to design more effective policies 
and to evaluate and improve their outcomes. 
Finally, chronically underfunded, EPA needs more resources to 
do the job that has been assigned to it by Congress and expected of it 
by the American people. 
 
 
 138.  See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 183–96 (2008); RICHARD H. THALER, CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN & JOHN P. BALZ, CHOICE ARCHITECTURE (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1583509. 
